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Which legitimacy?
Abstract1
The new “Lisbon Treaty”, which was tied up at the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) 2007 and which shall enter into force in January 2009, seeks to rebalance the
institutional structure of the European Union (EU) and thereby to recalibrate the
EU’s various sources of legitimacy. A central goal is to reduce the “EU-citizens gap”
and thus to enhance the EU’s supranational and social legitimacy. This paper exam-
ines the impact the reforms might have on one of the most influential actors of the
European Union – the EU Council Presidency – and its ability to link the EU closer
to its citizens. The concept of second-order legitimacy will be applied as a framework
for the analysis. It will be argued that the Lisbon Treaty provides room for manoeuvre
that would enable the Council Presidency to strengthen the ties between the EU and
the European citizenry. However, due to the Council’s functional logic, this margin is
clearly limited.
1. Legitimacy in the European Union
After the negative outcome of the constitutional referenda in France and the
Netherlands in spring 2005, the democracy and legitimacy deficit of the European
Union has been at the centre of debates among academics as well as practitioners
dealing with the EU. The forceful “Non” and “Nee” of the French and Dutch voters
were viewed as a symbol of citizens’ alienation from the European Union and ex-
posed the often-cited “EU-citizens gap”. The new “Lisbon Treaty”, which was tied up
at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2007, seeks to rebalance the institutional
structure of the European Union and thereby to recalibrate the EU’s various sources
of legitimacy in order to strengthen its supranational and social legitimacy.2
There is a wide range of legitimacy concepts, which is even more diverse when it
comes to assessing legitimacy at the international or supranational level. National
legitimacy paradigms apply only partly to international organisations, as institutions
and processes do not correspond to those known in the national arena. This has
become particularly clear with regard to the European Union, which has often been
described as a political entity sui generis. A variety of analytical paradigms have been
put forward to explain how the EU ensures its legitimacy, depending on the partic-
ular theoretical approach towards the process of European integration.3
– The output legitimacy paradigm posits that the Union achieves legitimacy through
its problem-solving capacity. Thus this approach focuses on outcomes from the
EU political system, and the regulatory capacity of the European institutions, to
measure legitimacy.4 Or as Føllesdal describes it, the EU can enhance its legiti-
macy from this perspective “when it identifies and implements solutions, secur-
ing goals that would otherwise be unattainable.”5 To ensure a high output, tech-
nocratic and regulatory bodies are created which act independently from their
principals, the respective national governments.
– The intergovernmental legitimacy paradigm is closely connected to the legitimacy
concept of Andrew Moravcsik. In this perspective, states as rational and interest-
driven actors delegate competences to the supranational level to resolve prob-
lems they would otherwise not be able to solve. At the same time, national actors
retain control of all relevant decision-making processes.6 In other words, actors
at the supranational level are clearly bound to an imperative mandate provided
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by their principals, the respective national governments. As such, the EU is legi-
timised through the legitimacy of the Member States, which the latter derive
from their respective electorates. To avoid a situation where the ability to control
decisions is blurred, voting occurs through unanimity, and each Member State
counts as equal.
– According to the supranational legitimacy paradigm, democratic legitimacy in the
EU would require the further development of EU institutions along the lines of
the political systems of the Member States. From this perspective, the main
obstacles to enhanced European democracy are the limited role of the European
Parliament, particularly its lack of the right of legislative initiative; the
Commission’s and Council’s lack of direct democratic accountability; the weak
representation of citizens; and the lack of intermediary structures. A fully supra-
nationally legitimised European Union would imply that citizens are fully able to
contest European politics.
– Drawing on Easton’s work on the diffuse support of citizens for a political
system,7 more recent academic research on the EU has elaborated the concept of
social legitimacy.8 Thalmaier conceives of social legitimacy as the demos’ability to
legitimate a political system.9 As Maier and Risse argue, “modern democracies
rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which
is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules.
Collective identification with a polity provides an important source of diffuse
support for political systems. The normative desirability and the empirical possi-
bility of a collective European identity are thus directly linked to the issue of the
democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union”.10 The existence of a
well-functioning public sphere11 as well as the personalisation and visibility of
politics play a crucial role in this concept.
In general, there has been a perceptible shift from largely technocratic and state-
centred concepts of legitimacy towards more citizen-centred legitimacy concepts.
The need to involve citizens in European decision-making processes has developed
from both a normative perspective as well as from a pragmatic point of view as more
and more decisions will depend upon a popular vote. Therefore, strategies to en-
hance supranational and social legitimacy have increased in importance. However,
crucial elements for establishing a European Union that enjoys social legitimacy,
such as a well-functioning European public sphere, are still not fully developed. In
the near term, the European Union will remain a political entity sui generis that fea-
tures both intergovernmental and supranational elements as well as social legitima-
cy elements and depoliticised regulatory and output-oriented elements. As
Hurrelmann argues,“none of [the legitimacy concepts] suffices on its own to legiti-
mate the EU in its present institutional shape, nor to sketch a convincing blueprint
of how the EU could be reformed to make it more legitimate. […] For this reason,
most analysts of European politics – and also most politicians participating in the
constitutional debate – would probably agree that the EU can only base its legitima-
cy on a combination of the different strategies.”12 This approach of combining differ-
ent strategies can involve both the application of different legitimacy concepts to dif-
ferent institutions (e.g. supranational and social legitimacy to the European
Parliament, output legitimacy to the European Commission, and intergovernmental
legitimacy to the Council) as well as the application of more than one paradigm to
one single institution.13
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However, the issue of how to calibrate the various legitimacy sources within the
institutional system of the EU has given rise to highly contested debates, because the
application of various concepts may involve trade-offs.14 For example, enhancing the
European Parliament’s role in the legislative process would involve strengthening
the supranational element while weakening the intergovernmental pillar by limiting
the Council’s role as dominant legislator. Additionally, strengthening instruments of
participation could hinder efficient policy output. Nevertheless, it is not impossible
to balance the different concepts, to establish positive-sum instead of zero-sum rela-
tionships and thereby to strengthen supranational and social legitimacy even if ele-
ments of intergovernmental and output legitimacy play a crucial role in European
politics. As Hurrelmann proposes, trade-offs can be overcome by taking into consi-
deration second-order legitimacy relationships,15 which he conceives of as “relation-
ships between different legitimacy strategies”.16 The EU Treaties offer room for
manoeuvre in various fields. Change can be achieved without a greater re-design of
the institutional balance of the EU. Legitimacy relationships both between the insti-
tutions and within specific institutions can be intensified and thus contribute to an
overall improvement of legitimacy in the EU.
2. The Rotating Council Presidency – Combining Intergovernmental,
Supranational and Social Legitimacy Elements
The rotating Presidency – which under the existing Treaties applies to both the
European Council and the Council of Ministers – has a long tradition in European
politics. Even in the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community, rotation
was introduced as a fundamental component of European politics. Regardless of
size, population or economic influence, every Member State has the right to chair the
Union for a clearly defined period of time. The principle of rotation and shared
leadership seeks to guarantee the equality of each Member State while simul-
taneously enabling coherence and co-ordination. In other words, this principle 
strives to establish a balance between the minimisation and concentration of agen-
da-setting powers, and the need for both leadership and sovereign equality among
Member States.
The Council of Ministers can be considered a hybrid between predominant inter-
governmental elements and lesser supranational elements. This ambiguity is reflec-
ted in both the institution’s structure as well as its functions and tasks. Recent
developments and changes in particular indicate that the Council is shifting from a
purely intergovernmental towards a more supranational structure. The expansion of
policy fields in which decisions are taken under qualified majority voting (QMV),
together with the formation of coalitions based on cleavages of left/right or
large/small, demonstrates that the myth of states as dominant and equivalent actors
no longer holds. Furthermore, especially the Council Secretariat and Coreper have
developed in an increasingly supranational direction. As Lewis argues, socialising
effects on the permanent representatives facilitate supranational elements much
more than the Council’s intergovernmental structure might suggest.17
As regards the Council Presidency, the formal functions and tasks also reveal supra-
national aspects which have been depicted in various publications.18 Especially the
principle of neutrality as a central characteristic of the Presidency serves the purpose
of the community, i.e. the supranational idea. It applies to the  Presidency’s duties
such as organising everyday work, brokering between  different interests, promoting
the integration process and representing the  Union in external affairs and in rela-
tion to other EU institutions.
Exploiting the Presidency?
Reciprocity…
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Nevertheless, the Council – particularly the Council Presidency – is far from being a
fully developed supranational entity. Disagreements during the Convention about
how to redesign the Presidency, together with the powerful determination of smal-
ler Member States to maintain the system of equal rotation instead of establishing a
continuous presidency as it will be the case in the European Council if the Lisbon
Treaty enters into force, provide empirical support for the thesis that national
governments still play a strong role in EU policymaking – and that they are eager to
defend this role. As newer research has shown, this becomes particularly clear
regarding the informal functions of the Presidency. The power of the chair and nation-
al-level issues and interests have a much greater impact than hitherto assumed.19
Even if the bulk of each Presidency’s work is path-dependent on previous decisions
as well as on external shocks, domestic political priorities can be put on the agenda
and thus find their way into the Union’s work programme. The very fact that each
state has the opportunity to chair the Council for a six-month period within a regu-
lar system of rotation enables individual Member States to put their national prefer-
ences on the table and, depending on the Presidency’s resources and capabilities, to
place these issues successfully on the EU agenda. According to Tallberg, it is precise-
ly the knowledge that each country will have its turn to chair the Council and to
influence the Union’s policymaking in accordance with its own national interests
and priorities that makes other Member States accept the “exploitation of the
Presidency office”.20
The prominent role of the Presidency has given rise to criticism, which is directed
primarily towards the tendency of national governments to promote their own pet
projects rather than common European goals. However, even though the Council
Presidency, as it is currently practised, embodies the risk that the Council chair may
focus on national priorities and interests, the risk that the Council Presidency will
dominate EU institutions and policymaking is rather minimal. This is because each
Member State is in a non-presiding situation for the vast majority of the time; there-
fore the strategy of pursuing national interests in an overly blatant manner invites
the danger of being marginalised immediately after a Member State relinquishes the
helm of the Council. Furthermore, despite the expansion of QMV in recent treaty
reforms, Council decisions frequently involve broad compromises among the
Member States. Particularistic interests and minority positions cannot overrule the
majority of Council members. Thus national interests that stray too far from the
general European consensus are unlikely to enjoy success in the Council decision-
making process.The risk of being dominated by the country holding the chair is there-
fore low.
Rather, the temporary transfer of leadership enhances the potential for a diverse and
rich agenda. From the very outset, the process of European integration has been 
driven forward by the forces of diversity and plurality. The wide range of policies
dealt with at the European level cannot be explained without taking different nation-
al traditions and preferences into account. The mutual learning and reciprocity that
this entails promotes efficiency and progress. Furthermore, the experience of holding
the EU Presidency for a clearly defined period of time may, to a certain degree, in-
crease public support for the EU in each respective Member State that chairs the
Council.21 Promoting and representing national interests during its Presidency can
demonstrate the Member State’s capacity to influence European policymaking.
Taking this line of analysis one step further, one could argue that when a Member
State visibly demonstrates to its own electorate its ability to actively shape EU policy-
making, this can make it more difficult for national governments to claim that
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Brussels is ruled by anonymous technocrats. Rather, the Presidency provides support
for the argument that governments can make a difference in EU policymaking.
These findings touch upon a function of the Council Presidency that is often men-
tioned in scholarly literature: the institution’s capacity to convey European politics to
citizens22 or, as Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace put it, the Presidency’s “socialisation
effect on national citizens”23. Paradoxically, it is the principle of intergovernmen-
talism and equality embodied by the system of rotation, which in terms of second-
order legitimacy can foster social legitimacy and a sense of ownership of European
politics. When a particular country holds the Presidency, public awareness of
European affairs is generally very high in that Member State. The heads of state and
government attract a high level of attention as European actors. Informal ministerial
meetings are organised in their respective country, delegations from other Member
States visit the national government and ministries, cultural events deal with Europe
and European politics, ministers and members of parliament place greater emphasis
on European politics than is the “usual”order of political business, and public debate
is structured more prominently around European issues. Even if national topics still
dominate public debate, the impressions and opinions of other Member States also
influence national discussions. Thus the Council Presidency can serve to make
European politics more public. Even if this falls far short of creating a well-function-
ing European public sphere, it is clear that such processes foster cross-border aware-
ness and transnational communication. This can lay the ground for facilitating simi-
lar patterns of thinking among Europeans. As a result, Europeans might recognise
each other as legitimate members of a common European space of communication
and identification, which is a central requirement for social legitimacy.
Taking all of these factors into consideration, it is essential to analyse how the pro-
visions of the new Lisbon Treaty regarding the reform of the Council Presidency will
serve to bring citizens closer to the European Union. Stated more generally: How
will the planned reforms foster supranational and social legitimacy? 
3. Reforming the Council Presidency – Changes for the Better?
When the Laeken agenda was drafted for the purpose of strengthening the insti-
tutional architecture and democratic nature of the European Union, two of its main
goals involved reforming how the Council and the Council Presidency function.
While various reform proposals had already been submitted and put into effect since
the early 1990s without significant Treaty amendments,24 the Convention and the
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference in 2003/2004 sought to enact deep-
seated reforms25 to the Council of Ministers and the European Council as well as to
the inter-institutional distribution of power. Points of discussion from earlier debates
over Council reform emerged once again, and even grew in significance, as the EU
faced the largest round of enlargement in its history and the Council’s capacity to
function effectively was at stake.26 The EU’s increasingly unwieldy agenda and rising
number of Member States presented obstacles to effective management, policy-
making and institutional functioning. As a result, more and more of the EU’s every-
day work was delegated to the European Council, which itself was increasingly con-
fronted with the inability of performing its assigned tasks as leader of the European
Union.
In addition to the issues of Council voting mechanisms, the streamlining of the
Council secretariat, the design of Council formations and the lack of transparency of
Creating a “differentiated
presidency”
Weak points of the reforms
Seeger · Rotation in the Council
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 6 · 2007 Page 9
Council meetings, the rotating Presidency was also at the centre of the debates. Even
in an EU of 15 Member States, the concept of rotation was called into question
because each Member State was forced to wait seven years between Presidency
terms. Thus an EU of 27 Member States and more would give rise to rotation “ad
absurdum”27. Critics stated that governments were likely to lose any motivation to
assume a leadership role over 26 or more other governments if they had to wait at
least 13 years between Presidency terms. Furthermore, it was argued that, in a club
of 27 or more members, new and small Member States in particular would be over-
burdened by the amount of work the Council Presidency would entail.28
The compromise set forth in the new Lisbon Treaty – which was carried over from
the Constitutional Treaty29 – reflects the intention to maintain a balance between the
traditional elements of the Council – i.e. intergovernmentalism as well as supra-
nationalism. By splitting the Presidency of the European Council and the Presidency
of the Council of Ministers, a “differentiated presidency”30 is designed to foster leader-
ship, coherence and continuity by simultaneously maintaining the principle of shared
power. According to the new Treaty of the European Union (nTEU)31, the future
President of the European Council will be in office for a term of 2.5 years (renewable
for one additional term, Art. 9b nTEU) and might thereby strengthen supranational
social legitimacy elements within the European Council.32 At the same time, the
half-yearly rotation within the Council of Ministers will be retained, which will pre-
serve the intergovernmental character of the institution (Art. 9c nTEU). However,
apart from the Foreign Affairs Council, which will be chaired by the newly introduced
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the forma-
tions of the Council of Ministers will be headed by a Team Presidency. As it is laid
down in the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the Team Presidency will encompass
three Member States for a period of 18 months.33 According to the Declaration on
Article 9c(9) regarding a Draft European Decision of the European Council on the Exercise
of the Presidency of the Council, which is attached to the nTEU, the team forming the
Presidency  “shall be made up on a basis of equal rotation among the Member States,
taking into account their diversity and geographical balance between the Union.”
This thereby strengthens the idea of linking consecutive Presidencies, a notion that
had already been developed at the 2002 European Council in Seville34 and further
elaborated in the Council’s Rules of Procedure in 200635. Hence more emphasis is
placed on the principles of shared leadership and supranational co-ordination while
there is less focus on the intergovernmental equality of each Member State.
However, it is doubtful whether the proposed reforms relating to the functioning of
the Council Presidency will entail changes for the better, especially with regard to
the Presidency’s ability to bridge the gap between the Union and its citizens. Several
consequences are likely to undermine the Presidency’s capacity to foster citizens
identification with the European Union: 
– With a permanent chair of the European Council, the relevance of the Council of
Ministers and its Presidency are likely to be diminished as the respective head of
state or government will lose its leading role. This might affect citizens’ feeling of
ownership of the EU. Thus, the Council Presidency might be weakened as a link
between the Union and its citizens, even if the principle of rotation is preserved.
– It is unclear which role the head of state or government of the country holding
the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers will play during the meetings
of the European Council. Hitherto, the European Council provides the respective
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government with a great opportunity to present himself as an influential
European actor. The Lisbon Treaty does not foresee any exceptional role for the
head of state or government of the country holding the Presidency of the Council
of Ministers. Thus, the visibility of the respective country will be significantly
diminished.
– Furthermore, confusion may arise over the distribution of tasks and duties. The
proposed provisions also lack precision regarding accountability and responsibil-
ity. This might lead to a substantial loss of transparency. Instead of providing the
citizens with personalities with clearly defined competences and responsibilities,
a highly complex structure of different actors will be set up, if the Lisbon Treaty
enters into force. The effects on the Union as a coherent actor might rather be
negligible or even counterproductive.
– In particular, the Council of Ministers Presidency’s task of acting as a representa-
tive toward third countries in matters involving foreign, security and defence
policy (together with the High Representative and the Commission President,
who complete the so-called troika) will be significantly restricted. If the Lisbon
Treaty enters into force, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (Art. 9d nTEU), together with the President of the European
Council, will be the Union’s leading external actors. One of the most visible func-
tions of the government holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers will
therefore be relinquished if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified.
4. Benefiting from the Room for Manoeuvre
It would appear unrealistic to implement radical changes to the provisions formula-
ted in the Lisbon Treaty.This means taking the new institutional architecture of lead-
ing actors as a given – i.e. the President of the European Council, the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of
the Commission, the President of the European Parliament and the rotating
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. We should therefore focus our attention on
those points where room for interpretation and manoeuvre remains: 
– The declaration on Article 9c(9) nTEU would maintain the rotation principle even
if Team Presidencies are introduced. The declaration states that “Each member of
the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all configurations of the
Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration.” It seems un-
likely in the near future that Member States will draw upon the provision accord-
ing to which “the members of the team may decide alternative arrangements
among themselves.” The principle of Team Presidencies has been in force de facto
since the 2002 European Council in Seville and de jure since January 1st, 2007.
However, as we have witnessed so far, even if national governments are urged to
coordinate their working programs and everyday work, little will change: the
respective national government holding the Presidency will remain much more
visible than its team members and will have enough space to develop its own
profile and present itself to a broad public audience.
– Furthermore, the idea of creating teams by its nature can serve to bring Europe
closer to the citizens and facilitate a European sense of belonging. If the countries
sharing the Presidency act as a team rather than as consecutive and separate pre-
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sidencies, the EU’s uniqueness as an entity of co-operation and compromise will
be underscored. According to the principle of “diversity and geographical balance
within the Union”, the acting team would represent the variety and plurality of
the Union and thus reflect the nature of European politics. This allows for a situ-
ation where the government holding the Presidency can shape its own profile on
the one hand, while the idea of commonly shared tasks and cooperation can be
highlighted on the other. However, this will depend strongly on how Member
States coordinate their actions. Therefore, it will be of utmost importance that
countries jointly chairing the EU are able and willing to share responsibility and
leadership. A situation of unhealthy competition should be avoided in which the
acting Presidency seeks to push through as much as possible and to enjoy its
“place in the sun”36 since its next Presidency term will remain far in the future.
– Much will depend on the personality of the first President of the European
Council. The heads of state and government should elect their chair according to
the principle of neutrality and its ability to act as a broker among Member State
interests. Less priority should be placed on the components of strong leadership
and prominence. Thereby, the President could fulfil its task as manager of the
European Council and as organiser and chair of European Council meetings
without interfering too deeply in day-to-day business. Furthermore, this ap-
proach would also minimise the likelihood of competition with the High
Representative and the President of the Commission. It would also enable the
rotating Presidency to develop a strong profile in the eyes of its national public as
well as the European public in general.
– According to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council meetings
will be prepared by the President of the European Council, the General Affairs
Council (GAC) and the Commission. Furthermore, since the Treaty states that the
Member State holding the Presidency of the GAC will also chair Coreper and the
preparatory bodies, the rotating Presidency will still be of considerable impor-
tance in the future.37 A strong role of the respective head of state or government,
in particular in political questions, should be taken into consideration, even if it
is the ministers of the country holding the rotating Presidency who chair the dif-
ferent Council formations. This should be communicated to the respective domes-
tic audience as well as to the general European public.
– It is the acting Presidency of the Council of Ministers who will conduct all rele-
vant inter-institutional negotiations on behalf of the Council. Particularly in light
of the increased use of the co-decision procedure, relations with the European
Parliament will become increasingly important. Therefore, the role of the acting
Presidency as a link to the European Parliament should be further strengthened.
By making this function of the rotating Presidency visible to European citizens,
the logic of how European policymaking is conducted, how decisions are taken
and how power is distributed across the different institutions could be made clear
and thereby enhance transparency.
– Since 2003, European Council meetings have taken place in Brussels, apart from
some informal meetings.38 European policymakers should consider holding at
least one of the two meetings normally held during the six-month Presidency
term in the Member State that holds the Presidency. This would ensure greater
public attention and media coverage in that Member State as well as in other EU
countries. Furthermore, the geographic and cultural variety of Europe would
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become apparent as the respective meeting venues are likely to draw high media
coverage. As regards the role of the head of state or government whose country
holds the rotating Presidency, a model of co-chairing the European Councils
should be taken into consideration.
– Visibility towards the national publics can be enhanced by strengthening the ties
between the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the respective national
parliament. This could trigger socialisation effects between the European and the
national level. Furthermore, it could stimulate debates about European topics in
domestic arenas and thus rising awareness of European issued among citizens.
– Finally, the acting Presidency can strengthen its profile by making use of infor-
mation and communication instruments and technologies. By organising meet-
ings, events or parties during their Presidencies, national governments can create
platforms for presenting their own ideas, interests and achievements as well as
EU-related topics to national and European public audiences. The Presidency
logo, slogan and website can make the EU more visible to citizens in their every-
day lives.39 Although the Presidency’s public relations efforts require additional
costs and resources, these efforts provide a crucial opportunity that allows the
Presidency to make its mark on everyday European politics.
5. Blame it All on the Council Presidency?
In this paper I have analysed the principle of rotation – as it applies to the Presidency
of the Council of Ministers – according to the logic of first- and second-order legiti-
macy strategies. I have examined the extent to which the Council Presidency, as one
of the most influential actors in European policymaking, is able to bridge the gap
between the EU and its citizens, and what impact the new Lisbon Treaty might have
regarding the EU’s various sources of legitimacy. I have argued that supranational
and social legitimacy play significant roles, even if the Council’s first-order legitimacy
is derived from intergovernmental factors. Furthermore, I have argued that, even if
certain reforms envisaged in the new Lisbon Treaty might undermine some of the
advantages of rotation according to the logic of first-order legitimacy, there is
enough room for manoeuvre for second-order legitimacy strategies to help maintain
some of the advantages the rotation principle offers for reducing the gap between
the EU and European citizens. As Westlake asserts, “the traditional rotating
Presidency does matter and will continue to matter.”40
However, it should be kept in mind that this function is clearly restricted. The EU’s
institutional system reflects a delicate balance between various elements of legiti-
mation. Each institution stands for a different facet of legitimacy: for example, while
the Commission embodies the principle of output legitimacy by enabling indepen-
dent experts to contribute to the policy-making process, the European Parliament is
characterised by the principle of supranational legitimacy. The Council, in contrast,
primarily reflects the principle of intergovernmental legitimacy, even if the expansion
of majority voting, the formation of coalitions along cleavages of large/small Member
States or left/right national governments, the derogation of power to partially inde-
pendent agents, socialising effects or the Presidency’s impact upon citizens incorpo-
rate elements of supranational and social legitimacy. As an actor on the European
stage, the Presidency is legitimized only indirectly by respective national electorates.
Deficits arise regarding accountability, transparency and mechanisms for contesting
Council decisions. Due to the lack of direct links between the Council and the
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European citizenry, the ability of the Council and the Council Presidency to bridge
the EU-citizens gap is clearly limited, even if second-order legitimacy strategies can
foster positive-sum effects.
Nevertheless, if the alienation of citizens from European politics is to be remedied,
the focus should be on those institutions whose functional logic is most conducive
to bridging the gap between the Union and European citizens. If the Lisbon Treaty
enters into force – which at the current stage is far from certain – the European
Parliament as the only directly legitimised European institution will gain the most in
relation to other European institutions. This would significantly enhance supranatio-
nal and social legitimacy, even if deficits still remain. The Council Presidency, in that
case, could focus on its designated tasks and streamline its functions that are direc-
ted toward coordination, brokering, representation and management.
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